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ACCOUNTING FOR FEDERALISM IN STATE COURTS  -  
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED LAWFULLY BY FEDERAL AGENTS. 
   Robert M. Bloom* & Hillary Massey**
Abstract 
 After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, Congress greatly enhanced federal 
law enforcement powers through enactment of the U.S.A. Patriot Act.  The Supreme 
Court also has provided more leeway to federal officers in the past few decades, for 
example by limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule.  At the same time, many states 
have interpreted their constitutions to provide greater individual protections to their 
citizens than provided by the federal constitution.  This phenomenon has sometimes 
created a wide disparity between the investigatory techniques available to federal versus 
state law enforcement officers.  As a result, state courts sometimes must decide whether 
to suppress evidence obtained legally by federal law enforcement officers but in violation 
of state law.  In deciding these cases the states usually rely on a state evidentiary basis 
ignoring federalism concerns. This article proposes a framework by which state courts 
may suppress this evidence while recognizing notions of federalism.   
Introduction 
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Suppose that FBI agents operating in the State of Oregon obtain a so-called sneak 
and peek warrant (authorized by U.S.A. Patriot Act, as described below) for the home of 
Mohammed Jones.  They believe he is a terrorist planning to blow-up the Oregon 
Museum of Science and Industry.  The warrant authorizes a search for bomb-making 
material, maps, computer records, documents, and material relating to terrorism.  In 
executing the warrant, the agents find none of the items listed but discover numerous 
marijuana plants in plain view.1 They seize the marijuana plants.  Jones receives the 
search warrant three weeks after the search.   
 Suppose further that Jones is charged in state proceedings with possession of large 
quantities of marijuana.  Jones seeks to suppress the marijuana, claiming that the search 
was illegal.  The state argues that the plants were seized lawfully by federal officers 
acting pursuant to a sneak and peek warrant and without any collusion by the state.  The 
defendant concedes that the federal officers acted lawfully pursuant to federal law but 
violated an Oregon statute requiring officers to present search warrants at the time of the 
search or to leave copies at the premises.   
 Should the state court admit the evidence?  More generally, should evidence that 
results from a federal law enforcement agent acting legally under federal law be admitted 
in state court when the agent’s actions constitute a violation of state law?  This question 
raises an important and unexamined topic in federalism jurisprudence.   An easy answer 
is that states may control evidentiary matters in their own courts.2  This is true to a 
certain extent and some state courts have excluded this type of evidence under such 
                                                          
1 A police officer conducting a legal search may seize illegal items in plain view as long as he has 
justification for the search and the incriminating nature of the item is immediately apparent.  Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
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reasoning.3  This article suggests, however, that there is a deeper level of analysis 
required when states impose their own laws or the remedies of their laws on federal 
officers acting lawfully under federal law.  In that situation a state’s action necessarily 
implicates the two principal elements of federalism found in the U.S. Constitution: the 
reservation clause of the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.  
This article examines the implications of those two constitutional provisions on states that 
must decide whether to admit this type of evidence in state courts.  
The Tenth Amendment4 reserves to the states those rights not specifically 
delegated to the federal government.  The Supremacy Clause declares all federal law 
supreme.5   “Together, these provisions describe a straightforward, generally applicable 
rule:  Where Congress and the President act within the powers expressly afforded them 
by the Constitution, their laws and acts prevail: in all other respects, power and authority 
reside with the states or with the people themselves.”6
 The boundaries between the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause are 
often ambiguous, however, because both provisions speak in generalities rather than 
specifics. This ambiguity is further complicated by the overlapping responsibilities 
between the two sovereignties.  As James Madison wrote, “the powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which are to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §11.03[4][d] (4th ed. 2006) (“A state judge has the 
power to control what evidence is admitted in his or her court.”). 
3 State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225 (N.M. 2001); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988); 
State v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d 399 (Or. 1993). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
6 Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity?  Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, 
and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2199 (2003).  In this article the authors analyze a related 
issue.  When may a state actually prosecute a federal official for acting pursuant to his federal duties but in 
violation of state law?  Id. 
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remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”7 The Court itself has 
recognized that some of its most difficult cases involve identifying the line between 
federal and state power.8  
 This article explores some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions elaborating on 
the intersection between the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause. It examines 
the impact of those decisions on state courts seeking to exclude evidence legally obtained 
by a federal officer pursuant to federal law.  This federalism issue is relatively novel in 
the criminal justice area because only in the last thirty years have states provided greater 
constitutional protections than the federal government.  States have done so in reaction to 
decisions by the Burger/Rehnquist Courts that have reduced the protections provided by 
the Bill of Rights. For purposes of this article this phenomenon is called the “new 
federalism.” It should be pointed out that “new federalism” also refers to any devolution 
of power from the federal government to the states upholding the importance of state 
autonomy. 
 With different standards controlling law enforcement officials as a result of the 
new federalism, a conflict exists between federal and state standards. A federal court 
must apply federal law when dealing with a federal official regardless of the law of the 
state in which it is sitting.  A federal court dealing with a state official must behave 
similarly.9  What is less clear is how a state court can treat a federal official who obtained 
                                                          
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-293 (James Madison) (Clinton. Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in U.S. v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) [hereinafter Federalist No. 45]. 
8 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).  
9 “In the absence of any federal violation, therefore, we are not required to exclude the challenged material 
[evidence obtained in compliance with federal law but in violation of state standards]; the bounds of 
admissibility of evidence for federal courts are not ordinarily subject to determination by the state.”  United 
States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1976).  See United States v. Vite-Espinoza, 342 F.3d 462 (6th 
Cir. 2003);  United States v. Chavez-Verrarza, 844 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987).  See James W. Diehm, New 
Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past? 55 MD. L. 
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evidence in accordance with federal law, but in violation of state law. This problem is 
sometimes referred to as the “reverse silver platter”10 issue. 
 This article begins by briefly tracing the history of the exclusionary rule and the 
line of cases that made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.  It then explores how 
the few states who have dealt with the question posed by this article have chosen to 
address it. Next it considers the Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions involving 
other conflicts between the state and federal governments to gain some sense of the 
balance of power.  Finally, this article suggests an Erie-type framework to resolve the 
federalism issues raised by the question it poses, and applies the proposed analytical 
framework to the above hypothetical situation involving a conflict between state law and 
the federal U.S.A. Patriot Act.   
I. History 
 The Bill of Rights promulgated at the constitutional conventions in 1787 was 
designed to protect individuals from the power of the federal government. For much of 
our history, between state and federal law enforcement officials, only federal officials 
were subject to these provisions.  In contrast, because individuals facing state criminal 
prosecution were afforded protections by state constitutions or statutory provisions, state 
law enforcement officials were not restricted by the Bill of Rights.11  The result was that 
federal defendants enjoyed more rights and protections than did state defendants.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
REV. 223 (1996); Kenneth J. Melilli, Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State 
Law, 22 GA. L. REV.  667 (1988). 
10 Diehm, supra note 8, at 244-47. Silver platter refers to a state official handing over evidence to a federal 
official.  See infra note 13. Reverse silver platter refers to a federal official handing over evidence for a 
state prosecution.  Diehm, supra note 8, at 244-47.  
11 Barron v. Baltimore 32 U.S. 243,247 (1833); LAWRENCE  M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 72 (1993) 
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 Although there were conflicts in the rights enjoyed in federal versus state courts 
during this early history, there were no conflicts in remedies available for illegal action of 
law enforcement personnel.  Neither state nor federal court provided as a remedy the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. This changed in 1914 when the Supreme Court 
decided in Weeks v. United States12  that evidence obtained by a federal official in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment was excluded from federal court.  The Court limited 
the exclusionary rule to federal officers because in 1914 the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply to state officers.13  Thus the Court admitted evidence obtained by state officials but 
excluded evidence obtained by federal officials.  To emphasize the differences between 
the two sovereignties (state and federal) the Court stated, “The effect of the Fourth 
Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials in the exercise 
of power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to exercise of such power and 
authority.”14
  With the advent of the Weeks doctrine in 1914,15 which created the exclusionary 
rule in federal courts, the disparate treatment of evidence between state and federal courts 
resulted in forum shopping and cooperation between federal and state officials to avoid 
the costs of the federal exclusionary rule.16  Federal officials involved in illegal obtaining 
of evidence sought to introduce the evidence in state courts and state officials not subject 
                                                          
12  232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
13 Id. 398 
14 Id. at 391. 
15  232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
16 Elkins v. United States 364 U.S. 206, 210-213 (1960) 
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to the exclusionary rule assisted their Federal colleagues by delivering the evidence to 
them on a silver platter.17
The adoption of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause after the Civil War 
provided the foundation for applying the Bill of Rights to the states.  In Wolf v. 
Colorado18 in 1949, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to states.  
However, the Court refused to find the exclusionary rule is an essential part of the right 
and thus admitted the illegally obtained evidence.  The Court in Wolf was reluctant to 
adopt the remedy of exclusion partly due to notions of federalism.19   In Abbate v. United 
States, the Court indicated that states should enjoy considerable flexibility in developing 
their criminal systems as intended by the Constitution: “the States under our federal 
system have the principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes.”20 In Elkins 
v. United States the Court attempted to rectify this disparity in the application of the 
exclusionary rule between state and federal officials through the use of its supervisory 
powers with the objective of ending the silver platter doctrine in federal courts.21  
Shortly thereafter, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court in 
Mapp v. Ohio22  held that states must adopt the exclusionary rule as a remedy for illegal 
law enforcement action because it is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment.  This 
decision eliminated much of the remaining intrajudicial conflict by requiring a uniform 
                                                          
17 The term silver platter was used in the Frankfurter opinion of Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 
(1949). “It is not a search by federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to federal 
authorities on a silver platter.” Id. 
18 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
19 Speaking about the exclusionary rule the Wolf Court said “We cannot brush aside the experience of 
States which deem the incidence of such conduct by police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by 
way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence.” Wolf at 31-32 
20 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959). 
21  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).For further discussion of supervisory powers  See Robert 
M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for its Re-emergence in the Adjudication of Criminal Cases, 84 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 462, 473 (1993).
22 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 7
remedy for constitutional violations.  Mapp v. Ohio involved a conviction under an Ohio 
statute that criminalized the possession of “certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures 
and photographs”.23  Appellant claimed the evidence should be excluded because it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.24  Prior to Mapp, the Court held the 
exclusionary rule was applicable only in federal courts.25   This exclusionary principle 
had not been applied yet in state actions.  The Mapp Court made this leap and held, 
“Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against 
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against 
them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.”26  
The Court wrote:  
 “Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than 
that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that 
to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial 
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”27
 Prior to Mapp, the dual standard of exclusion resulted in a so-called silver platter 
doctrine.  As previously mentioned, Elkins28 eliminated this in federal court and Mapp 
made the exclusionary rule applicable to the state courts. Finally federal and state law 
enforcement officials were governed by the same remedy of exclusion.  
The Warren Court, in addition to applying the federal constitutional protection to 
the state, also substantively expanded those protections. Decisions like Miranda v. 
Arizona and Terry v. Ohio provided greater protections to individuals as they faced the 
                                                          
23 Id. at 643. 
24 Id.   
25 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
26 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
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forces of the state. 29For the period of 1960s during the Warren Court era and for much of 
the 1970s during the early part of the Burger Court era, the same constitutional precepts 
applied to federal and state law enforcement officials.  This eliminated “needless” 
conflict between the two sovereigns and contributed to healthy federalism.30
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Burger Court cut back on the 
exclusionary rule and reinterpreted the Warren Court decisions to limit the protections 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment to individuals in their dealings with the police.31  
Justice Brennan, concerned about the cut backs to Warren Court decisions, urged states to 
use their own laws to expand on individual rights: “State courts cannot rest when they 
have afforded their citizens full protection of the federal Constitution.  State constitutions, 
too, are a part of individual liberties, their protection often extending beyond those 
required by Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”32  As Brennan suggests, the 
U.S. Constitution provides the baseline for protection of individual rights under the 
Supremacy Clause. Because the Constitution provides limitations on the power of 
government vis a vis the individual, however, it does not prohibit states from providing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27 Id. at 660. 
28 See  Supra note 16 
29 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (making on the street police encounters subject to the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (attempting to deal with the unreliability of 
eyewitness identifications); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (providing safeguards for 
interrogation proceedings); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (expanding Fourth Amendment 
protections for the standing requirement).   
30 “The very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state 
and federal court.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960), quoted in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.   
31 See, e.g.,  New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (creating a public safety exception to Miranda); 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating a good faith exception to exclusionary rule); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (limiting standing opportunities under the Fourth Amendment); United States 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (limiting the thrust of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule); United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (broadening the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement by permitting officers to open containers found on a suspect).  
27  William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,90 HARV. L. REV. 
489, 491  (1977).    
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greater protections to the individual. Some states following Brennan’s invitation began to 
interpret their own constitutional provisions to provide for greater rights to individual 
defendants.  An interesting irony has evolved.  Prior to the Mapp decision, the federal 
Constitution provided greater rights to individual defendants.  Immediately after Mapp, 
rights of federal or state criminal defendants vis a vis the police were parallel.  Now 
defendants in some states are enjoying more protection through state law.33 With the 
Burger Court’s retraction of the individual protections created by the Warren Court, an 
interesting juxtaposition has occurred in state courts. Interpreting their own constitutions, 
some states have become more protective of individual rights than required by the U.S. 
Constitution. Justice Stevens observed this point in a recent concurring opinion.34 This 
phenomenon has been characterized as new federalism.35   
 This new federalism coupled with increased leeway to federal law enforcement 
under holdings of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts as well as greater cooperation 
                                                          
33 See for example:  State v. Novembrino 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); State v. Glass 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 
1978): Commonwealth v. Upton 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985); People v. Johnson 488 N.E.2d 439 (NY 
1985). 
34 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart  126 S.Ct 1943 (2006) at 1950. 
35  Diehm, supra note 8 at 224; Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New 
Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST.L.Q. 92 (2002), James N.G. Cautlen, Expanding Rights Under 
State Constitutions: A Quantative Appraisal, 63 ALBANY L. REV. 1182 (2000). 
   We should point out that this trend did not go unnoticed by the Supreme Court, but there was not much 
they could do about it because the state decisions were based on independent state grounds and the Court 
only has ultimate authority over Federal Law.  When state courts based their decisions on a combination of 
state and federal law, the Supreme Court sought to avoid an unnecessary constitutional decision by 
remanding the case back to the state court for clarification.  In 1983, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 
(1983), the Court found a way to scrutinize the new federalism trend. In this case, the Court carefully 
examined a state court decision to see if there was any reference to federal law, which would give the Court 
a basis of jurisdiction as the ultimate authority on federal law. In finding a reference to federal law, albeit a 
narrow one, the Court in effect created a presumption that the state court decision was based on federal law.  
Id. at 1043.  With regards to any adequate and independent state grounds for the decision, the Court held 
that state courts must “make clear by a plain statement” if they were using federal precedent in their 
analyses but resting on adequate and independent state grounds.  Id. at 1040-42.  In this way the Court had 
greater leeway to review state court decisions. Justice Stevens in dissent argued that given scarce federal 
judicial resources, federal jurisdiction should be exercised when it is clearly necessary and therefore to 
presume that adequate state grounds are based on federal decisions goes against a strong sentiment to limit 
federal court jurisdiction.  Id. at 1067. 
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between federal and state law enforcement officers, provides the basis for potential 
conflict between state and federal courts.  The thrust of this article will look to the 
federalism issues when a state court seeks to apply its own legal and evidentiary 
standards with regard to evidence legally obtained by a federal official under federal 
standards.  It will focus specifically on federal law enforcement actions authorized by the 
U.S.A. Patriot Act.36   
II. State Courts and Federally-obtained Evidence 
 The question posed by this article is whether evidence seized by federal agents 
acting lawfully and in conformity with federal standards is admissible in state courts 
when the search would have been illegal under state law.  The majority of state courts 
have held that this type of evidence is admissible, unless the federal and state police 
worked together in a manner that satisfies the state action requirement.37  These courts 
reason that it does not make sense to exclude such evidence because state law cannot 
directly control or deter the conduct of federal officers.38  These courts often analogize 
the activities of law enforcement personnel of other jurisdictions to actions of private 
citizens or foreign officials, whom they have no power to control.39  As the Supreme 
                                                          
36 USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
37 The state action requirement asks whether federal and state police were working so closely so that federal 
officials were agents of the state. In Commonwealth v Gonzales 688 N.E.2d 455 (Mass.1997) evidence 
produced by federal DEA agent  was allowed into state court because the state involvement did not amount 
to a combined enterprise. In this case a Massachusetts statute (G.L. c. 272 Section 99) specifically 
exempted federal officers from a violation of Mass. laws if they were acting pursuant to federal law. 
38 Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293 (Ala. 1985); People v. Phillips, 711 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1985); People v. Blair, 
602 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1979); Basham v. Commonwealth., 675 S.W.2d 376 (Ken. 1984); Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. 1997)); State v. Hudson, 849 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. 1993); State v. 
Dreibelbis, 511 A.2d 307 (Vt. 1986); In Re Teddington, 808 P.2d 156 (Wash. 1991);  People v. Fidler, 391 
N.E.2d 210 (Ill.Ct.App. 1979). 
39 Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1301 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). Similarly, in federal courts, foreign 
officials typically are not governed by constitutional restraints.  See United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 
510 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. LaChapelle, 869 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Maher, 
645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir. 1965).  Foreign 
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Court of New Jersey stated in State v. Mollica, “a state constitution ordinarily governs 
only the conduct of the state's own agents or others acting under color of state law.”40   
 For example, the Court of Appeals of Texas refused to apply state law to evidence 
lawfully obtained by a federal official.41   In Pena, federal agents operating in conformity 
with federal standards near the border turned over evidence to state agents.  Even though 
the federal agents’ action did not meet a higher burden imposed by state law, the court 
admitted the evidence.  The court characterized the situation as a “reverse silver-platter” 
doctrine, writing “protection afforded by the Constitution of a sovereign entity controls 
the actions only of the agents of that sovereign entity.”  
 Some courts do apply state standards to exclude this type of evidence, however, 
and it is possible that more states will want to exclude such evidence as  the Supreme 
Court has continued to narrow the Exclusionary Rule42 and Congress has expanded 
                                                                                                                                                                             
officials are governed when they acted as agents of American law enforcement agents or when their search 
“shocks the conscience.”  Id. 
40 State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1324 (N.J. 1989).   
41 Pena v. Texas, 61 S.W.3d 745 (2001). 
42 In Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006), the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does 
not apply to violations of the knock and announce rule, but left intact the knock and announce rule as a part 
of Fourth Amendment analysis.  The Court held that the interests protected by the knock and announce 
rule—protecting life and limb, avoiding property destruction, and protecting personal privacy and 
dignity—would not be served by suppression of the evidence; thus, causation is too attenuated to apply the 
exclusionary rule.  Id. at 2164-65.  The Court also reasoned that since the substantial social costs of 
applying the exclusionary rule to knock and announce violations outweigh its deterrence benefits, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply.  Id. at 2165-66.  The Court’s majority found that alternative remedies, 
such as civil suits under 42 U.S.C §1983, could suffice to deter knock and announce violations; the dissent 
found this unsatisfactory, arguing that the Court’s previous inquiries had determined these remedies to be 
“worthless and futile.”  Id. at 1274-75. 
 Several Circuits have applied Hudson to reject the suppression of evidence.  The First Circuit held 
that a knock and announce violation during the execution of an arrest warrant does not trigger the 
exclusionary rule.  US v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194 (1st Cir., 2006).  In Hector v. United States, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected suppression, holding that even if a failure to provide a copy of a warrant were a 
constitutional violation, it would not be the “unattenuated but-for cause” of obtaining the evidence.  474 
F.3d 1150.  In United States v. Bruno, No. 05-41763, 2007 WL 1454359 (5th Cir. (Tex.) May 18, 2007), 
the Fifth Circuit held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to violations of the statutory knock and 
announce rule, as well as the Fourth Amendment rule addressed in Hudson. 
 Martin Estrada, in The Rise and Fall of the Constitutional Knock and Announce Rule, 54-FEB 
Fed. Law. 52, at 56-57, argues that, since the Court had declined in several previous cases to sever the 
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federal law enforcement powers with the USA Patriot Act.43  The courts that have 
excluded this type of evidence have tended not to address the federalism issue in their 
opinions, however.  Instead, they simply have applied their state laws to the federal 
agents without providing reasoning,44 or they have determined that the objective of the 
state’s exclusionary rule was furthered through exclusion of the evidence.45   
 One example of a court applying its state laws without addressing federalism is 
People v. Griminger, decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in 1988.  There, a 
U.S. Secret Service Agent sought and obtained a warrant from a federal magistrate to 
search the defendant’s home after an arrested counterfeiting suspect identified the 
defendant as a drug-dealer.46  The resulting search corroborated the informant’s story, 
and produced ten ounces of marijuana, over six thousand dollars in cash, and drug-related 
paraphernalia. The Secret Service turned over the evidence to state authorities for 
prosecution in state court and the defendant sought to suppress the evidence citing that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
knock and announce rule from the exclusionary rule, this decision represents a change in the Court’s 
approach to the exclusionary rule that could reach well beyond knock and announce violations.  Since the 
social costs of applying the exclusionary rule often include a high likelihood of permitting guilty 
defendants to go free—a substantial social cost—the Court’s cost-benefit analysis in Hudson has the 
potential to restrict further the exclusion of evidence if applied to other Fourth Amendment violations.  Id. 
 
43 For example, Patriot Act §218 amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to extend its 
searches and surveillance with reduced protections to cases where criminal investigation is the primary 
purpose.  Alison Siegler, The Patriot Act’s Erosion of Constitutional Rights, 32 NO. 2 Litigation 18 (2006).  
Relaxed protections against Fourth Amendment violations under FISA historically had been justified on the 
basis that its purpose was foreign counter-intelligence investigations.  Id.  
 Section 213 of the Patriot Act permits delayed notification (sneak and peek) search warrants in 
ordinary criminal cases, as long as the government is able to show to the issuing magistrate that immediate 
notification may have an adverse result.  18 U.S.C. §3103a; Siegler, supra, at 22.  In one case, this 
provision was used to surreptitiously inspect a storage locker during an investigation of the murder of a 
federal witness in a health care fraud case.  United States v. Mikos, No. 02CR 137-1, 2003 WL 22462560, 
at *1 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 29, 2003).  Other instances have “rang[ed] from a secret search of a judge’s chambers in 
an effort to uncover judicial corruption to the clandestine search of a nursing home during a healthcare 
fraud investigation.”  Siegler, supra, at 22.  Section 213 is discussed in detail below.  See infra pp. 46-47.   
 
44 Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1994); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988). 
45 State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 227 (N.M. 2001); State v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d 399 (Or. 1993).  
46 People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y. 2d 635 (1988). 
 13
the warrant lacked probable cause because it had not satisfied the reliability prong of the 
state’s Aguillar-Spinnelli test.47  The Court of Appeals of New York agreed, holding that 
the state was governed by a more stringent probable cause48 standard than the one 
adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court.49 Reasoning that “[s]ince defendant has been tried 
for crimes defined by the State’s penal law, we can discern no reason why he should not 
also be afforded the benefit of our State’s search and seizure protection…”,50 the court 
dismissed the argument that a federal official executing a warrant from a federal 
magistrate should be governed by the more flexible federal standard.51 The court did not 
expressly mention federalism in its decision.   
 Other state courts conduct an exclusionary rule analysis to determine whether to 
admit evidence obtained by a federal law enforcement agent pursuant to federal law but 
in violation of state law.52  These courts examine the policy reasons underlying their 
states’ exclusionary rules, which typically are deterrence, judicial integrity, and 
protection of individual rights.53  States with a deterrent objective typically admit this 
                                                          
47 Id. at 638. In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Supreme Court adopted a so-called two prong 
test for a magistrate to evaluate information provided by an unnamed informant. This test was further 
elaborated on in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). One prong asks why is the informant 
reliable and the second prong asks how did the informant get the information provided.  See id. 
48 People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y. 2d 398 (1985). 
49 In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court abandoned the two prong test and adopted a 
more flexible test so the prongs are no longer independently evaluated.  The Court characterized the two 
prong test as too rigid and opted for a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.  
50 Id. at 641. 
51  Id.  
52 State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1324 (N.J. 1989); State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 227 (N.M. 2001); 
King v. State, 746 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).  
53 FRIESEN, JENNIFER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §11.03[4][a] (4th ed. 2006).  The Weeks Court 
introduced the notion of judicial integrity, writing that illegal police behavior “should find no sanction in 
the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to 
which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.” 
Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
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type of evidence, 54 while states seeking to promote judicial integrity or protect individual 
rights typically exclude the evidence.55   
 An example of a state whose exclusionary rule’s purpose is deterrence is New 
Jersey. As previously mentioned, its Supreme Court decided to admit disputed evidence 
in State v. Mollica in 1989.56  There, federal law enforcement officers obtained hotel 
billing records relating to defendant’s use of his room phone.  They gave the records to 
state officials who obtained a warrant.  The procurement of these records is legal under 
federal law,57 but constitutes an unreasonable search under New Jersey law.58  The court, 
in refusing to suppress the evidence resulting from the search warrant, looked to the 
deterrent purpose of the state’s exclusionary rule.  The court concluded, “no purpose of 
deterrence relating to the conduct of state officials is frustrated, because it is only the 
conduct of another jurisdiction’s officials that is involved.”59   
 Notably, the New Jersey Supreme Court, commenting on new federalism, wrote 
that its approval of federal action supported federalism.  “Because the constitution of a 
state has inherent jurisdictional limitations and can provide broader protections than 
found in the United States Constitution…, the application of the state constitution to the 
officers of another jurisdiction would disserve the principles of federalism.”60  The court 
reasoned that protections afforded to criminals by an individual state constitution only 
                                                          
54 Pena v. Texas, 61 S.W.3d 745, 754 (2001).  “Because federal officers operate throughout all the various 
states, in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, under federal authority, and in accordance with federal 
standards, they are treated in state court as officers from another jurisdiction.” See id.  See also State v. 
Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315 (N.J. 1989). 
55 State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 227 (N.M. 2001). 
56 554 A.2d 1315 (N.J. 1989). 
57 There is no Fourth Amendment applicability when the state obtains information voluntarily provided to 
third parties.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
58 State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (1982). 
59 Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1328.  
60 Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1327. 
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apply to the law enforcement personnel of that state and cannot be used to control the 
actions of police from other states or a foreign jurisdiction.  “Stated simply,” the court 
wrote, “state constitutions do not control federal action.”61   
   An example of a state whose exclusionary rule purpose is protecting individual 
rights is New Mexico.  There, the Supreme Court of New Mexico interpreted its 
exclusionary rule to “effectuate…the constitutional right of the accused to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure.”62 In Cardenas-Alvarez, the court held that the state 
constitution’s exclusionary rule applies to federal officers because those officers possess 
the authority to subject New Mexico residents to searches and seizures, and therefore 
those officers are governed by New Mexico law.  Because protecting citizens from such 
an intrusion is the purpose of the exclusionary rule, the court held that the rule must apply 
to evidence seized by federal officers when the state seeks to use it in state court.63  Thus, 
the court suppressed evidence obtained by a federal Border Patrol agent pursuant to 
federal law but in violation of New Mexico law.  
 The issue of federalism was raised by a concurrence that expressed concern for 
the court “making illegal what federal law makes legal for federal agents.”64  “I fear that 
the majority leads this Court into dangerous territory by interrupting the delicate balance 
between state and federal power.”65  The concurrence wrote that the New Mexico 
constitution does not apply to federal agents for two reasons: 1) the provisions of a 
constitution generally relate only to the sovereign that is the subject of that constitution 
and 2) given the absence of any federal precedent allowing the provisions of a state 
                                                          
61 Id. at 1327. 
62 Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d at 232. 
63 Id. at 232.  
64 Id.at 237. 
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constitution to apply to federal actors, such application violates federal supremacy.66  The 
concurring justice quoted Bivens that “state law [may not] undertake to limit the extent to 
which federal law can be exercised.”67  The majority minimized this concern by noting 
that the decision only affected evidence introduced in state court and did not preclude 
federal officials from using the evidence in federal court or otherwise restrict their 
activities within the border.68
 The concurrence in Cardenaz-Alvarez raises federalism concerns that are ignored 
by most states applying state law to exclude evidence lawfully obtained by federal agents 
pursuant to federal law.  The next Part explores these federalism issues in detail.  
 III. Federalism   
 As highlighted in the decisions above, the issue of when a state court may exclude 
evidence seized by a federal agent acting lawfully under federal law but unlawfully under 
state law raises many questions that touch the crucial relationship between the state and 
federal governments: Should federal law enforcement agents, for reasons of comity, be 
subject to different standards depending on which state they are in? What power does a 
state have to tell a federal agent how to act?69  May states through their evidentiary rules 
reject evidence obtained by federal officers in the discharge of their federal duties?70 
                                                                                                                                                                             
65 Id. at 234 (Baca, J., concurring). 
66 Id. at 235-37. 
67 Id. at 236 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 
(1971)).
68 Also see State v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d 399 (Or. 1993) for a similar decision involving evidence obtained 
by special agents of the INS. 
69 The federal government does not have the power to direct state legislatures or officials..  See Printz, v. 
United States 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
70 See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal 
Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195 (2003) for an argument that states may not prosecute 
federal officers acting reasonably within the scope of their employment and may not pass statutes 
subjecting federal officer to greater liability for Constitutional violations than that provided by Bivens. 
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Does the doctrine of pre-emption ultimately preclude a state court from utilizing its own 
evidentiary standard in this context?  
 The questions surrounding this issue are all timely and pressing in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks and the Bush administration’s War on Terror.  Federal legislation 
addressing terrorism gives federal officials greater power, greater flexibility, and greater 
means to investigate crime.  It is likely that some of these new powers are constitutional 
under the U.S. Constitution, but illegal under an individual state’s laws.  This tension is 
especially relevant because terrorism has triggered a new era of cooperation between 
federal and state law enforcement officers.71  In fact, one of the primary 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission is to increase cooperation between federal and 
state law enforcement agencies in order to deter and prevent future domestic terrorist 
attacks.72  FBI director Robert Mueller in testimony before the Senate Intelligence 
Committee in February 2003, characterized local police as "important force multipliers" 
for federal police intelligence gathering.73
 There is an interesting dynamic at play in the call for greater cooperation between 
federal and state law enforcement agencies to fight terrorism.  On some issues prior to 
9/11, including racial profiling, the federal government urged states to limit certain 
practices74 and many states complied.75  Since 9/11, however, state law enforcement 
                                                          
71 John P. Mudd, Deputy Director, FBI, In Domestic Intelligence Gathering, the FBI is Definitely on the 
Case, WALL ST. J., Mar, 21, 2007, at A17 (noting that in recent years the FBI has “shifted massive 
resources into counterterrorism and counterintelligence, and made commensurate advances in [its] 
relationships with state and local law enforcement, tripling the number of joint terrorism task forces.”).  
The mission of these task forces, which include local and state police officers, is to “prevent acts of 
terrorism before they occur, and to effectively and swiftly respond to any actual criminal terrorist act by 
identifying and prosecuting those responsible.”  http://boston.fbi.gov/taskforce.htm 
72 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES, 2004 , www.9-11commission.gov/report, at Chapter 13, 399-400.  
73 Cisun Lee, The Force Multipliers, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 26, 2003, at 25. 
74 In speech before Joint Session of Congress, President Bush in January 2001 directed Attorney General 
Ashcroft to develop guidelines for racial profiling. Attorney General Ashcroft ordered the Civil Rights 
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officials have been reluctant to carry out the directives and policies of the federal 
government, particularly those applying to immigrants.76   This reluctance might bolster 
the state courts’ purpose to protect individual rights within their borders.77   
  Terrorism in particular has the potential to change the federalism landscape.78   In 
the past, liberals traditionally have championed initiatives to make the federal 
government stronger while conservatives have sought to restrain federal powers through 
the Tenth Amendment.  Indeed, since the early 1990s, a five member majority79 of what 
was then the Rehnquist Supreme Court consistently promoted state sovereignty when 
determining federalism issues through the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce 
Clause.80  The majority’s concern for states’ rights in relation to these two constitutional 
provisions was particularly heightened in regards to traditional police power in the 
enforcement of criminal law.81   
A. States’ Rights and the Tenth Amendment 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Division of the Department of Justice to develop guidance to end racial profiling. Before guidance was 
issued, terrorist events of September 11, 2001 took place. (The Guidance was issued by Civil Rights 
Division in June 2003, taking into account terrorist concerns.  Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 
Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies (June 2003), 
www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf. 
75 2000 state anti-racial profiling law in Massachusetts requires traffic citations to indicate the race of the 
violator so that the racial aspect of traffic stops can be monitored.  Laws for 2000 Act 228 approved by 
Governor August 10, 2000. 
76 Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2005, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. (2005).  Terry 
Golway, Back Into the Shadows, NY TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005. 
77 See Kiera Hay, Calif. Officials Denounce Raids, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (Santa Fe North Edition), 
March 1, 2007, at 1; available at http://www.abqjournal.com/santafe/542283north_news03-01-07.htm 
   
78 Susan N. Herman, Our New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 
69 BROOK. L.REV. 1201 (2004). 
79 Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy and O’Connor. 
80 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2005. “The Rehnquist court in recent 
years has proved more sympathetic to enforcing limits on Congress’ power than any court since 1937: 
between 1995 and 2003, the court struck down 33 federal laws on constitutional grounds-a higher annual 
rate than any other Supreme Court in history.”  See id. 
81 See Justice Thomas’ dissent in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 62-64 (2005). 
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 In recent Tenth Amendment decisions, the Court has restricted Congress’s ability 
to regulate state legislatures and executives.  Specifically, it has held that Congress may 
not require the states to act affirmatively.82  In doing so, the Court has stressed the 
importance of the Tenth Amendment.  In New York v. United States83  the Court refused 
to allow Congress to impose on the states the obligation to take affirmative steps to enact 
a federal regulatory program (nuclear waste facilities).  In Printz v. United States, the 
Court held that Congress cannot direct state law enforcement officials to implement 
federal legislation.84  Specifically, the Court in Printz considered whether hand gun 
legislation could command the chief state law enforcement officer designated by the state 
to conduct background checks.  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia pointed to the 
history and structure of the Constitution in regards to state sovereignty and held that 
Congress could not force a state to implement a federal regulatory program.  It is 
interesting to note that Justice Stevens in dissent asked prophetically whether states could 
be required to perform in a case of national emergency resulting from international 
terrorism.85   
 These cases do not directly resolve the problem raised by this article.  They do, 
however, demonstrate the Court’s concern for the power of states when dealing with 
traditional Tenth Amendment issues.  Certainly the criminal adjudication process within a 
state court system is the type of responsibility reserved to the state by the Tenth 
Amendment.   
B. States’ Rights and the Commerce Clause 
                                                          
82 A related question is whether Congress may regulate state courts.  See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal 
Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001).  Professor Bellia argues that Congress 
has no authority to prescribe procedural rules for state courts to follow in state law cases.  Id.  
83 505 U.S.144, 178 (1992). 
 20
 Further indications of the Court’s willingness to restrict the power of Congress vis 
a vis the states can be found in the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  From 
1936 to the 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez,86 the Court did not find a single 
Congressional Act unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause.87  Then, in 
Lopez, the Court reviewed the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, which made it a 
federal crime to possess a gun within one thousand feet of a school zone.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist concluded in the opinion of the Court that the act was unconstitutional because 
it did not substantially affect interstate commerce.88  Although not specifically 
mentioning the Tenth Amendment, the Court stressed the importance of the state’s power 
to deal with criminal matters, writing “States possess primary authority for defending and 
enforcing criminal law.”89  The Court further explained that “[u]nder our federal system, 
the administration of criminal justice rests with the State except as Congress, acting 
within the scope of these delegated powers, has created offenses against the United 
States.”90   
 Justice Kennedy, concurring, talked about the balancing of scales to insure the 
appropriate alignment of power between the state and federal governments.91  Justice 
                                                                                                                                                                             
84 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
85 Id. at 940. 
86 Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
87 Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 260 (2nd ed. 2002).  See also 
Judge Louis H. Pollak, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995). 
88 In his analysis, Rehnquist chose the more narrow "substantially affect" standard as 
opposed to simple “affect” in declaring the act unconstitutional. This choice indicates his 
concern for state sovereignty and by inference his attitude for principles of federalism.   
89 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561n.3 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)). 
90 Id. (quoting Screw v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945). 
91 Id. at 578. 
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Thomas, also in concurrence, pointed out that the Constitution gives federal government 
only enumerated powers and was not intended to abrogate state criminal institutions.92   
  Next, in United States v. Morrison in 2000, the Court invalidated the federal 
Violence Against Women Act (authorizing victims of domestic abuse to sue for monetary 
damages).  The Court held that Congress did not have the power to so legislate under the 
Commerce Clause because domestic abuse did not have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.93   The majority felt this was the type of non-economic activity traditionally 
regulated by the states.  To uphold the Act would give Congress power to regulate all 
violent crime, an area the Court felt was better left to the states.   
 These Commerce Clause cases indicate the Court’s reluctance to allow Congress 
to regulate criminal conduct.  In its most recent decision of Gonzales v. Raich, however, 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as 
consistent with Commerce Clause power.94  This might be seen as a setback for the “new 
federalism.”95  The validity of the CSA, a comprehensive regulation of the interstate 
market in drugs, was not at issue in the case. Rather, the plaintiffs challenged the statute 
as applied to purely intrastate conduct, possession of marijuana.  Thus, the issue in Raich 
was quite different from those in Lopez and Morrison, which involved on its face 
challenges to statutes having nothing to do with economic or commercial activity.  
 In a decision by Justice Stevens, joined by his three compatriots who dissented in 
Lopez and Morrison (Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer) and Justice Kennedy; with 
                                                          
92 Id. at 584. 
93 Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  Another 5-4, the same split as in Lopez. 
94 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
95 Id. Professor George Brown in his article Counterrevolution?—National Criminal Law after Raich, 
characterized the Raich decision as “more of a stopping point, a refusal to extend, than any form of serious 
cutting back of the basic thrust of Lopez and Morrison.”   George Brown, Counterrevolution?―National 
Criminal Justice After Raich, 66 OHIO ST L.J. 947, 986 (2005). 
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Justice Scalia concurring in the judgment, the Court found that Congress could regulate 
the cultivation of marijuana.96 Notably, in her dissent Justice O’Connor expressed 
disappointment that the Court in applying the Commerce Clause did not consider the 
state’s role in the criminal law area. “Because fundamental structural concerns about dual 
sovereignty animate our Commerce Clause cases it is relevant that this case involves the 
interplay of federal and state regulations in areas of criminal law and social policy where 
a state lay claims by right of history and expertise.”97  She wrote that the federal 
government should bear the burden to justify its regulation in these areas.  
 Lopez, Morrison, and Raich provide evidence that the Court splits along 
ideological lines.  Those upholding the power of Congress favor a strong federal 
government whereas those finding that Congress has overstepped its bounds seek to 
insure the sovereignty of the individual states.  The role of law enforcement in the War 
on Terror may represent a paradigm shift in this regard. With preoccupation by the 
federal government on the War on Terror and the resulting legislation that poses a 
reduction in individual liberty, the proponents of a strong central government now might 
favor greater state protections of the individual.  On the other hand, with the 
government’s focus on national security, centralized federal authority might seem 
necessary to those who typically favor state authority.  Will the terrorism threat have the 
effect of changing the Justices’ alliances on these impartial federalism issues?98     
                                                          
96 The decision did not address whether a California law allowing for limited marijuana use for medicinal 
purposes could be used as a defense if the case were prosecuted in state court.  The Court noted that it was 
not interested in the California criminal statute. Raich, 545 U.S. at 16. The decision dealt with the 
cultivation and production of marijuana, not the criminal conduct associated with it.  Unlike Lopez, this 
case was not brought before the Supreme Court to enjoin criminal enforcement of the CSA, but rather to 
invalidate the portion of the law enabling DEA agents to destroy marijuana plants. 
97 Raich, 545 U.S. at 48 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583). 
98 Susan N. Herman, Our New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 
69 BROOK. L.REV. 1201, 1205-06 (2004).  It is interesting to note that the Justices departed from their 
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 The relationship and allocations of power between federal and state entities are 
constantly in a state of flux.  While the Constitution provides the general outline, exact 
contours remain fluid and ambiguous.  This tension is especially apparent in examining 
what power state courts have over the actions of federal law enforcement.    
C. State Control over Federal Law Enforcement 
 State courts generally cannot tell federal officials what to do.99  In Tarble, decided 
in 1872, a Wisconsin state magistrate issued a writ of habeas corpus directing a recruiter 
for the United States Army to discharge a soldier on the grounds that the soldier was a 
minor who had enlisted without the consent of his father.100  The Court held that the state 
had no power to compel the recruiter to act.  Reasoning that within each state there were 
two sovereigns “independent of each other and supreme within their respective 
spheres,”101  Justice Field explained that should a conflict exist, the law of the United 
States would be Supreme as enumerated in the Constitution.   Justice Brennan reiterated 
this principle in his majority opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics102 stating:  “For just as state law may not authorize federal 
agents to violate the Fourth Amendment… neither may state law undertake to limit the 
extent to which federal authority can be exercised.”103   
                                                                                                                                                                             
typical positions regarding states’ rights in the 2006 case of Gonzales v. Oregon, in which the Court 
considered the applicability of the federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA) to a state-created physician 
assisted suicide law.  546 U.S. 243 (2006).  The majority, including Justices who typically favor a strong 
central government, held that the CSA does not prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for 
purposes of suicide.  Id. Notably, Justices Thomas and Scalia, who consistently have sought to limit federal 
power vis a vis the state, dissented in the decision.   
99 In re Tarble, 80 U.S. 397 (1872). 
100 Id. at 398. 
101 Id. at 406. 
102 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
103 Id at 395. 
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   Federal officials are sometimes subjected to state standards, however.  For 
example, federal prosecutors are subject to state ethics rules even though they operate in 
federal courts.104  This is not a function of federalism, but rather the result of the McDade 
Act, passed by Congress in 1999.105  The Act mandates that federal attorneys are bound 
by states’ professional rules “to the same extent and in the same manner as other 
attorneys in that state.”106  Thus, federal prosecutors must follow rules of professional 
ethics, but not state substantive or procedural rules that are inconsistent with federal law 
in violation of the Supremacy Clause.107
 In addition to ethics rules for federal prosecutors varying by state, the application 
of federal criminal law also often varies by state.  This is because the federal government 
often borrows from state criminal laws and outcomes.108   For example, the federal 
government uses state criminal history information in federal prosecutions to calculate 
sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines and also uses this information to charge felon-
in-possession cases.109  In addition, the federal government sometimes borrows actual 
state criminal laws.110  In doing so, the federal government infuses its own law “with the 
normative judgments of the respective states.”111 Rather than being applied uniformly 
nationwide, the application of federal law varies by state.   
                                                          
104 R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS (West 2005).  
105 28 U.S.C. §530B (2006). 
106 §530B (a). 
107 United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999). 
108 Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime 
Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65 (2006).  
109 Id. at 75-83. 
110 For example, the Assimilative Crimes Act authorizes the use of state criminal law in federal enclaves in 
certain circumstances.  18 U.S.C. §13(a) (2000).  See Logan, supra note 104 at 71.  Federal courts also 
apply state law in civil diversity of citizenship cases under the Erie Doctrine. 
111 Logan, supra note 104, at 67.  
 25
 Given this background, is it appropriate for state courts to exclude the evidence at 
issue in this article (evidence obtained by federal agents pursuant to federal law but in 
violation of state law)?  Although Tarble holds that a state may not directly control or 
order a federal agent’s actions, the situation in Tarble is distinguishable from the issue 
presented by this article.  When state courts refuse to accept evidence obtained through a 
federal agent’s legal compliance with a lesser federal standard, they are not controlling 
the agent, but merely controlling their own judicial system.  Unlike the situation 
presented in Tarble, such states are not attempting to regulate the agent’s conduct.  
Instead, they are struggling with how to deal with that agent’s completed action in a state 
criminal proceeding.112   This area always has been left to the States.  How, then, may 
states exclude this evidence while taking important federalism issues into consideration?    
IV. ERIE 
 The problem raised by this article requires a resolution that addresses the 
federalism question.  One possible answer, and the approach this article suggests, is to 
apply the approach taken by the Erie Doctrine.113  Despite resurrecting the nightmares of 
first-year law students, the Erie doctrine provides an effective framework in determining 
whether the evidence that results from a federal law enforcement agent acting legally 
under federal law should be admitted in state court when the agent’s actions constitute a 
violation of state law. 
                                                          
112 But see Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d at 237 (Baca, J. concurring) (writing that in applying state law to 
exclude evidence obtain legally by a federal official pursuant to federal law, the majority was “not merely 
promulgating a rule of evidence, but creating a state constitutional right” and noting that individuals whose 
rights are violated might then invoke the judicial process and seek compensation similar to a Bivens claim.) 
113 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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 The Erie Doctrine generally speaking determines which law a federal court sitting 
on a diversity case should apply when there is a conflict between federal and state law.114  
Erie “announces no technical doctrine of procedure or jurisdiction but goes to the heart of 
the relations between the federal government and the states, and returns to the states a 
power that had for nearly a century been exercised by the federal government.”115  Under 
the Erie doctrine, federal courts apply state law when the law is regarded as substantive 
and federal law when the law is regarded as procedural.  As the Court points out, 
“classification of a law as “substantive” or “procedural” for Erie purposes is sometimes a 
challenging endeavor.”116 To determine the Erie substantive procedural divide, the Court 
has developed three tests: the outcome determinative test,117 the refined outcome 
determinative test,118 and the balancing test.119  The balancing test works best for the 
purposes of this analysis.   
 In the balancing test, the court weighs the state interest against the federal interest.  
On the state side of the balance, the court weighs the importance of a particular law to a 
state’s statutory scheme and asks how bound up a particular practice is to the state’s 
legislative policy. Also on the state side of the balance is an outcome determinative 
                                                          
114 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 416 (1996); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965); id. Prior to Erie, federal judges sitting in diversity could ignore state law and apply federal common 
law so as to promote uniformity between federal courts under the Swift Doctrine. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 
(1842).  Ultimately, this practice resulted in widespread forum shopping because federal and state courts in 
the same state were applying different laws.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 76-77.  The Erie decision recognized that 
federal courts were limited by the Constitution in creating general common law applicable to the states 
because the Tenth Amendment left many matters to the states.  Although the decision by Brandeis in Erie 
did not directly refer to the Tenth Amendment, he did state that the Swift scheme was unconstitutional and 
some  have interpreted the language “in applying the Swift doctrine this Court and the lower courts have 
invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states.”as referring to the 
Tenth Amendment Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 207-210 
(4th ed. 2005 
115 Charles Alan Wright, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §55 (3rd ed. 1998).  
116 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 416 (1996). 
117 Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
118 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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analysis—the degree of probability that the outcome will be affected by the choice 
between federal and state law. On the federal side of the balance, the court considers the 
importance of the law to federal policy.  
 In its interpretations of the Erie decision, the Supreme Court has been very 
cognizant of the supremacy of federal law.  In the case of a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure in direct conflict with a state rule, the federal rule applies because of the 
Supremacy Clause.120  In the event of a conflict between a state practice or law and 
federal law, the Court has interpreted federal law narrowly to avoid a conflict.121 In these 
situations the conflict is with federal practice.  When there is no direct conflict with 
federal legislation that implicates the Supremacy Clause, the Court has engaged in a so-
called “unguided Erie” analysis.122  Some commentators have suggested the “unguided” 
aspect refers to courts employing whatever test provides the desired outcome.123  
  The recent decision of the Court in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc. 
provides a good illustration of some of these concepts and demonstrates how the Court 
utilizes whatever approach will result in the desired outcome.124  Indeed, one of the more 
interesting aspects of Gasperini is that it utilized various pieces of the Erie analysis to 
arrive at its desired results.125
 In Gasperini, a jury awarded damages in the amount of $450,000 to a plaintiff in 
federal court in New York. The defendants moved for a new trial claiming that the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
119 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
120 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
121 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).   
122 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.   
123 Gregory Gelfand and Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U.PITT. L. REV. 937 
(1988). 
124 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
125 Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law:  Some Reflections 
on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751 (1998). 
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damages were excessive. New York State law allows a trial judge to set aside a jury 
damage verdict when it “deviates materially from what would be reasonable 
compensation.”126 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 does not specifically address 
excessive damages, but courts have allowed for new trials when the verdict “shocks the 
conscience”.127
 Thus, the conflict in Gasperini pitted a lesser state law standard (deviates 
materially) that allowed the trial judge to set aside the verdict against a more stringent 
federal standard (shocks the conscience).  In resolving this conflict, the Court read FRCP 
59 narrowly, holding that there was nothing in the rule that indicated the standard for 
excessive damages. This interpretation avoided a direct conflict between the two 
standards that would have necessitated applying the federal standard because of the 
Supremacy Clause.  The Court applied the New York law because it was substantive, part 
of a tort reform movement to reduce excessive verdicts (bound up with substantive 
policy), and because the difference in law (outcome determinative) might result in forum 
shopping as plaintiffs might want to avoid a trial judge overturning a jury verdict.  
 The second issue in Gasperini involved the appellate process. The New York state 
tort reform statute directs appellate courts to review the trial judge’s determination de-
novo.128 The federal standard on the other hand, defers to the trial court and reviews a 
factual decision only if there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.  The 
                                                          
126 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 425. 
127 Id. at 429. 
128 Review everything as though it had not been determined previously. 
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Court resolved this conflict in favor of the federal standard finding a strong federal 
interest, thus implying the use of a balancing test approach.129
 Just as federal courts must decide which law to apply, state courts often must 
decide whether to apply state or federal law.130  This occurs when state courts hear 
federal claims, as required under their concurrent jurisdiction.131  When state courts hear 
federal claims, they may apply their own procedural rules unless those rules are 
preempted under federal law.132  With regards to the elements and defenses, however, 
state courts must apply federal law.133  When a state court hears a federally created cause 
of action, the Supremacy Clause mandates that the “federal right [not] be defeated by the 
forms of local practice.”134  Thus, just as federal courts sitting in diversity apply state 
substantive law and federal procedural law, state courts hearing federal claims apply 
federal law on clearly substantive questions and generally apply state law on clearly 
procedural questions..135  Of course, many cases lie somewhere in the middle, involving 
quasi-procedural issues but no direct preemption or direct conflict with a federal statute.  
                                                          
129 In its case review, however, the Harvard Law Review wrote that Gasperini eviscerated the Byrd 
balancing test because the Court declined to apply the approach even though both cases involved conflicts 
between state laws and judge-made federal practices.  See Erie Doctrine, 110 HARV. L. REV. 256, 265 
(1996).  
130 Kevin M. Clermont, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: Reverse Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 
23-37 (2006). 
131 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).  Refusing to hear these federal claims is a violation of the 
Supremacy Clause.  Id.  Refusing to apply federal law because of disagreement with its content also 
violates the Supremacy Clause.  Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 55-57 
(1912). 
132 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).   
133 Monessen Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335 (1988) (holding that proper measure of 
damages, including whether prejudgment interest may be awarded, is substantive issue to which federal law 
applies); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 3-23 (1990) (holding that state law sovereign immunity defense 
not available in §1983 action brought in state court when such defense would not be available in federal 
court). 
134 Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949).  
135 “Inverse-Erie” doctrine refers to cases where a state court hears a federal claim under concurrent 
jurisdiction.  JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 247-48 (4th ed. 2005).  State courts are 
required to apply federal substantive law, but may apply state procedural rules.  Id. at 248-49.  The 
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For those cases, state courts conduct an analysis very similar to Erie in which they 
balance state interests, federal interests, and outcome differences.136  
 Before any court may conduct an Erie analysis, however, it must determine the 
nature of the conflict between federal and state law.  Because federal law is supreme, the 
court must determine if federal law preempts state law.  Thus a preemption analysis is 
necessary.  
V. Preemption 
 A court conducts a preemption analysis to determine if there is a federal law that 
trumps the state law. Preemption is just another aspect of federalism as it allocates power 
between federal and state entities.   
 When a congressional act implicates important functions of state government 
there must be a clear indication from Congress that the act was intended to preempt.  The 
Court has indicated that this so-called “plain statement rule” should be applied whenever 
a statute “upset[s] the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.”137  When 
dealing with the scope of a state’s traditional police power, in particular, the Court has 
been reluctant to find preemption unless there is a clear Congressional purpose.  “[T]he 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Supreme Court has limited the application of state procedural rules, requiring state courts to mirror federal 
procedure in cases where this is deemed necessary to protect federal rights.  Id. at 249.   
136 See Clermont, supra note 125 at 33 [“reverse-Erie balancing means no more than contextualized 
exercise of judgment in the face of competing interests.”]  The outcome differences the courts seek to avoid 
in reverse-Erie analysis vary slightly from those in Erie.  Id. at 36.  In reverse-Erie, the aim is prevention of 
interstate forum shopping in order to preserve uniformity of federal law from state to state.  Id.  Intrastate 
forum shopping is less of a concern than in the Erie setting because typically parties have equal access to 
federal court.  Id.   Thus, in reverse-Erie analysis the outcome determinative test weighs in favor of 
applying federal law, whereas in the Erie setting it weighs in favor of state law. Id.   Reverse-Erie is a 
“more intrusive doctrine” as a result of the Supremacy Clause, in that state courts apply federal procedural 
law to federally created claims more than federal courts apply state procedural law to state claims.  Id. at 
38, 44. 
137 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991). 
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assumption [is] that the historic powers of the states [are] not to be superseded by 
…Federal Act unless that is clear and manifest [intent] of Congress.” 138
 Preemption can occur when a state law directly restricts the functioning of the 
federal government.  For example a state may not require by statute that a federal postal 
employee have a state driver’s license.139 Neither can it require a state stamp on fertilizer 
when a federal law authorizes its distribution by a Department of Agriculture official.140  
As discussed above, states may not directly control federal officers.  The question posed 
by this article is more nuanced, however.   
 With this general introduction to the Erie Doctrine and Preemption, this article 
now suggests a way for state courts to suppress evidence obtained by a federal officer 
pursuant to federal law.  Utilizing this Erie-like analysis gives the state courts an 
analytical avenue to reach the desired result while recognizing important federalism 
issues. 
VI. Proposed Framework 
 The Erie balancing test provides a useful framework for resolving the issue 
addressed by this article.141  Under this framework, state courts deciding whether to 
admit evidence obtained by federal officers should identify the state interests that would 
be promoted by excluding the disputed evidence, and weigh those interests against the 
federal interests at stake.   
                                                          
138Id. at 485. 
139 Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920). 
140 Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943).  These cases involved state laws which directly affects 
federal officials “in their specific attempt to obey order”.  Johnson, 254 U.S. at 57. 
141 Reverse-Erie does not apply directly because the issue posed by this article is whether a state court 
hearing a state crime should admit evidence obtained by a federal officer. Reverse –Erie refers to civil 
matters. 
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  Application of this framework to the state cases that have ruled on this issue may 
lead to the same results reached by those courts under an exclusionary rule analysis.  For 
example, where courts have decided to admit the evidence even though a federal official 
violated state law, the courts have looked at the purpose of the state exclusionary rule, 
found that its purpose is deterrence, and then ruled that because a federal official’s 
jurisdiction is beyond the state, the deterrent rationale is inapplicable. “Thus, in that 
context, no purpose of deterrence relating to the conduct of state officials is frustrated 
because it is only conduct of another jurisdiction's officials that is involved.”142 Similarly, 
under the analysis proposed by this article, the state court should admit the evidence 
because the state substantive interest in regulating the behavior of agents outside its 
jurisdiction is much less strong than the federal  interest in the ability of federal officers 
to introduce evidence obtained in compliance with federal law but not state law in state 
courts. 
 Further, where courts have decided to suppress the evidence, the courts have 
looked to protection of individual rights as the purpose of the exclusionary rule and found 
that this purpose is furthered by suppression of the evidence. Under the proposed 
framework, courts deciding to exclude such evidence would weigh the state substantive 
interest in protecting individual rights and the outcome determinative effect of any 
contested physical evidence against the federal interest mentioned above.  Here a court 
reasonably could conclude that the strong state interest outweighs the federal interest.   
 When considering the state’s interests, courts must consider the outcome 
determinative effect.  In the criminal context, however, it is difficult to determine if 
suppression of the evidence actually is outcome determinative because the remainder of 
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142 State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1328 (N.J. 1989). 
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the evidence might be sufficient for conviction. Therefore, in translating the outcome 
determinative aspect of the Erie balancing test to the criminal context, the harmless error 
standard presents the best approach.143  The key question in this analysis is: Can the 
government demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the introduction of the evidence 
will have no effect on the jury decision?144  In answering this question the court would 
have to examine the other evidence and determine the importance of the evidence in 
question to the government’s case. Because contested physical evidence often is crucial 
to the government proving its case, it may well have a substantial outcome determinative 
effect. If this is so, the test weighs in favor of applying state law which would protect the 
individual.      
VII. Hypothetical  
 It may be helpful to restate the hypothetical before applying the proposed 
analysis.  FBI agents in Oregon find marijuana while searching the home of Mohammed 
Jones pursuant to a sneak and peek warrant authorized by the U.S.A. Patriot Act.  In 
conducting the search, they violate state law by failing to leave a copy of the warrant.  
State prosecutors want the state court to admit the drugs into evidence.  Jones seeks to 
suppress, arguing that the federal agents violated state law and thus the court should 
apply the exclusionary rule.    
 A. The Patriot Act - Background and Constitutionality 
                                                          
143 This standard was originally adopted in Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The burden is on the 
government to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not contribute to the jury verdict, thus 
the error would be harmless. 
144 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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  Congress passed the U.S.A. Patriot Act just six weeks after the September 11th 
attacks, without congressional hearings or floor debate.145 The Act greatly enhanced the 
investigatory tools available to federal law enforcement agents.  The hypothetical focuses 
on the provision that allows for so-called “sneak and peek” warrants.146  The version of 
this provision in effect from 2001 until 2005 allowed a federal law enforcement official 
to get a warrant to search a person’s house or business and seize property without giving 
notice to the subject of the search for a ‘reasonable period’.147  Between October 2001 
and January 21, 2005, the government requested and used delay notification warrants 155 
times.148  Then in 2005, Congress amended the Patriot Act, including the delay 
notification provision.  The new section 114 requires law enforcement officials to give 
notice of a warrant within thirty days, unless they can show good cause.149  Each 
additional delay must be ninety days or fewer except in exceptional circumstances.  There 
is no restriction on number of permitted ninety day delays.150
 Officers may dispense with notice if they can show reasonable cause that notice 
will result in adverse results.  Adverse results include a catch all phrase “otherwise 
seriously jeopardizing an investigation.”151  Although seizure of goods seems to be 
prohibited by Section 3103a (b) (2), there is an exception when “reasonable necessity” 
exists.  The sneak and peek warrant is not limited to terrorism and can be utilized 
whenever the search is for evidence which constitutes a violation of U. S. law.  The 
                                                          
145 The USA PATRIOT ACT, enacted on October 26, 2001, recently was amended by the USA PATRIOT 
Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
146 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §213, 115 Stat. 272, 285-86 (2001).. 
147 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §213,  115 Stat. 272, 285-86 (2001). 
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Justice Department refers to the “sneak and peek” power as a valuable law enforcement 
tool that can be utilized in a “wide spectrum of crucial investigations including terrorism 
and drugs.”152     
 The constitutionality of sneak and peek warrants has not been determined.153  To 
do so, the Supreme Court would turn to the reasonableness clause of the Fourth 
Amendment and engage in a balancing between the nature of the intrusion and the 
governmental interests involved.154  This type of balance was referred to by Justice 
                                                          
152 Savage and Klein, supra note 143 at A4. 
153 Susan N. Herman, The U.S.A. Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 67, 100-01 (2006).  Professor Herman suggests that the constitutionality has not been litigated 
because the parties who would have standing often do not learn that they have been the subject of this type 
of search due to the very secrecy that they would contest.  Id.  
 In U.S. v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519, at *1 (E.D.Wash. Dec. 23, 
2005), the court noted that “…a valid §3103a search is likely constitutional given that the Supreme Court 
has ruled ‘the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all surreptitious entries’” (quoting U.S. v. Freitas, 800 
F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986)).  The court in Espinoza strictly interpreted the terms of §3103a, requiring 
the issuing court to make express findings of reasonable cause that immediate notification would have an 
adverse result, pursuant to §3103a(b)(1); as well as reasonable necessity for any seizure of property, 
pursuant to §3103a(b)(3).  Id. at 2.  The court found that these specific findings must be explicit either on 
the warrant itself or in a written order accompanying the warrant.  Id.  This requirement was patterned after 
the findings required for the issuance of a wiretap order pursuant to 18 U.S.C §2518, as indicated by the 
Supreme Court in Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).  Id.  In Dalia, the Supreme Court noted that 
§2510(4) requires the issuing court to specify the scope of surveillance, parties and place to be monitored, 
and the agency conducting the wiretap.  Dalia, 441 U.S. at 250.  The Court in Dalia stated, “[t]he plain 
effect of the detailed restrictions…is to guarantee that wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there is a 
genuine need for it and only to the extent that it is needed.”  Id. 
 On September 10, 2007 U.S. District Judge Ann Aiken heard arguments in Oregon challenging the 
Patriot Act on Fourth Amendment grounds.  A decision is expected shortly.  The challenge was raised by 
Brandon Mayfield, a lawyer who was wrongly arrested in connection with the 2004 Madrid train bombings.  
Prior to his arrest, federal agents used National Security Letters (authorized by the Patriot Act) to obtain 
information for its investigation and also searched his home and office with a warrant obtained under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  [Note to editing staff: we need a citation here; hopefully the 
decision will come down soon.  If not, see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/10/AR2006031002027.html and 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-10-patriotact-lawsuit_N.htm] 
 On September 06, 2007, U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero invalidated on First Amendment and 
Separation of Powers grounds provisions of the U.S.A. Patriot Act that authorized the F.B.I to issue 
confidential National Security Letters to obtain email and phone records.  Doe, ACLU, & ALCU 
Foundation v. Gonzalez, ---F.Supp.2d---, 2007 WL 2584559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  The judge characterized 
those provisions as “the legislative equivalent of breaking and entering.”  Id. at *27. 
154 Fourth Circuit held failure to give notice did not render a search unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) (writing that  “The Fourth 
Amendment does not mention notice, and the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution does not 
categorically proscribe covert entries, which necessarily involve a delay in notice.”).   
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Brennan as “Rorschach-like.”155 In Wilson v. Arkansas, looking at whether knock and 
announce was required in the execution of a search warrant, the Court turned to the 
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment.   Although the Court indicated that the 
Fourth Amendment does not require notice in every instance, (for example when there is 
a possibility that evidence will be destroyed or officers injured),156 the absence of notice 
for a surreptitious entry “casts strong doubt on constitutional adequacy.”157   
 Recently, however, the Court granted greater leeway to law enforcement agents 
conducting surreptitious entries when it held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to 
violations of the “knock and announce” rule.158  In Hudson, police officers executing a 
search warrant waited only a few seconds after announcing their presence before entering 
through the suspect’s front door.159  Although this police action violated the common law 
“knock and announce” rule, the Court held that violation of the rule did not require 
suppression of the resulting evidence because the interests behind the rule have nothing 
to do with the seizure of evidence.160  
 Search warrants frequently are executed in homes, the sanctity of which is highly 
valued in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.161  Therefore, when weighing the nature of 
the intrusion, the Supreme Court might find that the intrusion is severe and might be 
reluctant to allow for a surreptitious entry when a home is involved.  On the other hand, 
the Court likely would find that the government interest in preventing another terrorist 
attack is exceptional.  In the balance, it is likely that the Court would uphold sneak and 
                                                          
155 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985). 
156 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995). 
157 U.S. v. Freitas,  800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (1986), (citing  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 46, 60 (1967)). 
158 Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006). 
159 Id. at 2162. 
160 Id. at 2165. 
161 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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peek warrants given the importance of the government interest in fighting terrorism.   At 
any rate, this article will assume Section 114 is constitutional.162
B.  Application of Proposed Framework to the Hypothetical  
  Assuming the constitutionality of Section 114, let us analyze Oregon’s substantive 
concerns along with the outcome determinative effect and balance them against the 
important federal interests including fighting international terrorism and preserving tools 
for federal law enforcement officers investigating it.  
 The state of Oregon has a specific statute requiring that an officer executing a 
search warrant read and give a copy of the warrant to the person in control of the 
premises or, if no one is there, leave a copy of the warrant at the premises.163  In a case 
where there was a violation of the statute (no actual warrant was provided at the time of 
the search) but the defendant was informed at the time of the search  of the existence of 
the warrant and the fact that it had been issued, the Oregon Court of Appeals did not 
suppress the evidence because it was a minor violation.164  However, the court did 
indicate that if the violation were aggravated, it would reach state constitutional 
dimensions and the evidence would be suppressed.165  In the hypothetical posited above, 
the warrant was received some three weeks after the search which would certainly 
indicate an aggravated violation of the statute.   
                                                          
162 See Robert v. Dunbar Jr., Celebrating Student Scholarship:  Surreptitious Search Warrant and the U.S. 
Patriot Act:  “Thinking Outside the Box but Within the Constitution,” Or a Violation of Fourth Amendment 
Protections, 7 N.Y. CITY. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
163 Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.575 (3) (2003). 
164 State v. Blasingame 873 P.2d 361, 389 (Or. Ct. App.) (cited in  State v. Henderson, 113 P.3d 944, 948 
(2005)). 
165 Id.  
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 In the state of Oregon, the courts interpret the purpose of their exclusionary rule 
derived from Article I §9 of the Oregon Constitution as a protection of the individual.166 
Thus, when there is a violation of the Oregon Constitution, the exclusionary rule operates 
not as a deterrent but as a protection to the individual to vindicate Constitutional rights.    
This protection is triggered whenever “the Oregon government seeks to use the evidence 
in an Oregon criminal prosecution.”167  
 In summary in this hypothetical there is a violation of Oregon law because of the 
sneak and peek warrant executed by the FBI.  Mohammed is being tried in state court for 
a drug charge and seeks to suppress the marijuana plants found as a result of the 
violation.  How would a court apply the proposed framework in this hypothetical? 
 First, a court would determine the nature of the conflict between state and federal 
law. Forty-five days after September 11, 2001, in an atmosphere of high national anxiety, 
Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.”  In this hypothetical 
we have Section 114168 of the USA Patriot Act as amended in 2006, and Section 133.575 
(3) of the Oregon revised statutes.169  A court first would ask whether the Patriot Act 
preempts state law.  Congress must clearly indicate its intention to preempt state law in 
matters implicating important functions of the state government under the “plain 
statement rule.” Although the Act recognizes the importance of sharing information 
between the FBI and CIA and local law enforcement agencies, it does not mandate that 
state individual protections should be disregarded in the obtaining of the information.  
                                                          
166 State v. Davis, 834 P.2d 1008 (Or. 1992). 
167 State v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d at 403 (Or. 1993). 
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There is no indication that the law was designed to preempt state law.  First, there is 
nothing in the Patriot Act that expressly states that it preempts state law.  Further, the 
statute specifically talks about a warrant for “evidence for a criminal violation of the laws 
of the United States.”170  The Patriot Act does not specifically prohibit the state from 
suppressing evidence obtained in violation of state law.  There is no indication that they 
were considering state law.  There is no implied preemption as the Act is not so pervasive 
as to address state prosecutions.  Further, courts have been very reluctant to find 
preemption in regards to responsibilities traditionally reserved to the states, such as the 
state criminal prosecution posited in this hypothetical.  
 This case is analogous to Oregon v. Rodriquez.171  There, an agent for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service obtained an INS administrative arrest warrant.  
While executing the warrant, the agent found guns.  In the state criminal trial, the 
defendant moved to suppress the guns because the INS warrant did not comply with 
Oregon law.  The Oregon Supreme Court, in addressing the preemption issue, found that 
the federal immigration law had nothing to do with the precise charges being brought in 
state court.  By applying preemption, the court found no interference with the federal law 
and thus applied the state law.172   
 With no preemption there is no direct conflict with federal legislation. 
Consequently, a court could apply the framework proposed by this article by weighing 
the state and federal interests under an Erie-like balancing test. As to the state interests, 
the court would consider Oregon’s interest in passing and upholding its criminal laws, as 
                                                          
170 18 U.S.C. 3103(a) (a) (2005). 
171 854 P.2d 399 (Or. 1993). 
172  Id. at 403-04.  The court admitted the evidence because its seizure did not violate state law or the 
Fourth Amendment.  
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well as Oregon’s exclusionary rule whose purpose is to protect the individual, the 
traditional Tenth Amendment power to control state criminal prosecutions, and any 
outcome determinative effect.  Here, the outcome determinative effect would weigh 
towards application of state law because suppression of the marijuana would likely 
determine the outcome of the case.  
 A court would balance these substantial state interests against the federal interests.  
Arguably there is a strong federal interest in allowing federal officers to introduce in state 
court evidence obtained pursuant to  the Patriot Act, which can be found in its 
purpose―“to deter and punish terrorist acts in United States and around the world, [and] 
to enhance law enforcement investigation tools.”173 Still, an Oregon state court 
reasonably could find that Oregon’s interests, coupled with the outcome determinative 
effect, outweigh the federal interests and therefore could apply state law. 174
 If this same scenario occurred in New Jersey and such surreptitious warrants were 
illegal under New Jersey law,175 a court might reach a different result. In New Jersey, the 
purpose of the state exclusionary rule is to deter state police officials.  Under the 
proposed framework, the court would weigh the purpose of the state exclusionary rule,176  
the traditional Tenth Amendment power to control state criminal prosecutions, and the 
outcome determinative effect just mentioned against the strong federal legislative intent. 
Because the purpose of the state exclusionary rule would not be implicated in this 
instance—as there is no desire to deter federal officials—federal law may apply or at 
least the balance does not weigh as heavily in favor of state law as the Oregon example.   
                                                          
173 USA Patriot Act, Pub L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001). 
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Although this analysis reaches the same result as the state exclusionary rule rationale, it 
recognizes the important federalism concerns. 
VIII. Conclusion 
 In the past few decades, state courts have provided greater individual protections 
than the federal constitution.  It is likely that they will continue to do so now that the 
Congress and the Supreme Court are granting greater leeway to federal law enforcement 
officers through legislation such as the Patriot Act, and through decisions limiting the 
scope of the exclusionary rule and expanding exceptions to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment.  As Congress continues to trade civil liberties for national 
security, some state courts will seek to protect their citizens from unwarranted 
government intrusions by limiting the use of evidence obtained pursuant to federal law 
but in violation of state law.  To promote legitimacy, however, state courts must take into 
account the federalism issues raised by this article when deciding whether to suppress 
evidence obtained lawfully by federal agents.  They may not merely apply state law to 
suppress the evidence.  Rather, they should conduct the Erie-like balancing test proposed 
by this article to weigh the state substantive interests against the federal interests in a 
manner consistent with the Supremacy Clause.  In many cases this proposed framework 
will allow state courts to suppress the evidence and also give due respect to notions of 
federalism.  
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